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L Introduction and Research Questions 
Fran~is Mitterrand, the first socialist President of France since the second world 
war, recently stated: "Faciliter l'acces de tous aux oeuvres, aux savoirs, d'hier et 
d'aujourd'hui, telle est la premiere ambition des grands projets" (Mitterrand 
1989: 5). Apparently, different social strata do not participate equally in high 
culture, be this is a matter of viewing paintings in art museums, attending the 
opera or reading library books, and the extent to which the lower social strata are 
underrepresented in cultural audiences can be changed by government policies. 
These ideas are not new, nor restricted to France. They were expressed, for 
instance, in the Netherlands before the second world war by the social democrat 
Boekman (1939). But the cultural activities undertaken by the French state during 
the 1980s were surely more spectacular than those of any other government at 
that time. 
For most contemporary industrial nations the positive relation between such 
factors as education and income, on the one hand, and reading literature, going to 
the theater, attending concerts of classical music etc. on the other, has been amply 
demonstrated by survey research. Cultural participation indeed is a socially 
unequally distributed phenomenon. However, until now the question of whether 
this relation is about the same in all industrial nations or weaker in countries 
governed by parties generally favorable to high culture, has remained an open 
one. The one major comparison of cultural inequalities in industrial nations is by 
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Bourdieu and Darbel (1969), and involves museum visitors in France, Greece, the 
Netherlands, and Poland. It did not yield any conclusion about differences 
between countries. 
This paper addresses the question of similarities or differences in cultural 
participation between present-day industrial nations in two different ways. First, 
for 5 countries in a multivariate model the effects on an index of cultural 
activities are estimated of a person's education, income, and father's education, 
and tests for dissimilarities between nations are performed. Second, for 17 
countries the bivariate strength of the relationship between a person's education 
and frequency of theater attendance is established, after which an attempt is made 
to explain any differences between countries in the strength of this relation by 
invoking the right-left orientation of its government and other country character-
istics. Whereas the first empirical exercise involves various forms of cultural 
participation, several personal background characteristics, and a low number of 
countries, the second one includes a high number of countries but only one 
cultural activity and one background characteristic. 
2. Theoretical Background and Predictions 
Inequality or stratification is one of sociology's major questions, and this ques-
tion has often been divided into various subproblems. Among the more frequent-
ly treated subproblems are income disparities (do left-wing governments de-
crease income differentials?), social mobility (does comprehensive schooling 
make for more intergenerational occupational mobility?), and connubium or 
heterogamy (has the extent to which like marries like decreased in the course of 
time?). This paper treats questions about the strength of the relation between 
personal background and participation in various forms of high culture not only 
as yet another part of the general sociological problem of inequality, but also as a 
particularly interesting, although somewhat neglected, subproblem of it. 
Longstanding hypotheses in sociology hold that industrial nations, if not 
already much the same in their pattern of stratification (Upset, Bendix 1959), are 
converging towards inequalities that are similar and small (Kerr et al. 1960). 
However, recent research has shown that these nations continue to differ in 
income disparities (Sawyer 1976), social mobility (Ganzeboom, Luijkx, Treiman 
1989), and educational heterogamy (Ultee, Luijkx 1990). Stratification is weaker 
in industrial nations having attained a higher level of economic development 
(say, West Germany) than in those still at a lower level (Ireland). There is 
evidence that prolonged social democratic rule (Sweden), net of economic 
development, makes for smaller income differences (Hewitt 1977), more social 
mobility (Erikson, Goldthorpe, Portocarero 1982), and more educational hetero-
gamy (Ultee, Luijkx 1990). One qualification is that immigrant countries (Cana-
) 
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da), despite their rightist politics, display more social mobility (Heath 1981). 
Findings on communist rule (Hungary) have been less equivocal: income differ-
ences are smaller (Connor 1979) and social mobility is higher (Heath 1981), but 
educational heterogamy seems less widespread (Ultee, Luijkx 1990). Because of 
the necessarily small number of industrial countries involved (about twenty) and 
the less than desirable comparability of the data, these findings remain prelimi-
nary. The issue of whether politics makes a difference is far from being settled. 
The first hypothesis to be tested in this paper, therefore, holds that in 
industrial nations the relation between personal-background factors and cultural 
participation is about the same. Upon rejection of that null hypothesis, two 
alternative ones are tested. They are obtained by simple generalization from 
research on other aspects of inequality. The first says that communism, social 
democracy, and immigration weaken the relation between a person's social 
characteristics and cultural participation. The other holds that the higher the 
economic development of an industrial country, the weaker the relation between 
the background characteristics and cultural activities of its citizens. 
These two hypotheses about the effects of country characteristics lean 
strongly on the assumption that a person's behavior is determined by her or his 
resources, and the assumption that economic development and government 
determine the financial resources persons have at their disposal. Higher econom-
ic development, with its rising general standard of living, lowers financial 
barriers to cultural participation, and so do social democratic and communist 
governments. A policy of relatively free immigration also lowers barriers to high 
culture. 
It is against the background of these assumptions that the French sociologist 
Bourdieu (1979) developed an alternative for the perhaps all too easy prediction 
that economic development and egalitarian politics make for smaller cultural 
inequalities. The government of an industrial nation may have vast powers, but it 
is not all-powerful. People have a strong tendency to mark themselves off from 
others, and if members of the higher strata can no longer use certain resources to 
that effect because of governmental measures, they will use others. If financial 
obstacles no longer keep a society's lower strata from entering higher education, 
members of the upper strata will transfer to their children more cultural resources 
making for school success (De Graaf 1986). Also, if upward mobility does 
increase, members of the upper strata resort to a marriage strategy making for the 
pooling of resources - that is, to more homogamy - in order to maintain their 
position (Ultee, Luijkx 1990). Despite state action, inequalities persist because 
elites employ compensatory strategies. 
The predictions inspired by Bourdieu to be tested in this paper are about yet 
another compensatory strategy. If those with higher education lose ground 
because of smaller income disparities prompted by economic development or 
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left-wing politics, those with higher education can no longer distinguish them-
selves by material consumption. Under this condition, participation in high 
culture becomes a more attractive option for gaining distinction. Financial 
barriers against the cultural activities of the lower strata may have been weak-
ened, but these strata still lack the competencies for appreciating Culture. Thus, 
the higher a country's level of economic development, the stronger will be the 
relation between the education of its inhabitants and their cultural activity. 
Further: in countries with a social democratic or communist government, the 
relation between a person's education and cultural participation will become 
reinforced. Finally: in countries where the relation between education and in-
come is stronger, the connection net of income between a person's education and 
cultural participation will be weaker. 
Since these Bourdieu-inspired predictions are contrary to those made on the 
basis of conventional arguments about economical development and left-wing 
politics, questions about differences between industrial countries with respect to 
cultural inequalities are all the more interesting. The following sections seek to 
test the predictions outlined here. 
By applying Bourdieu's notion that compensatory strategies make for the 
reproduction of inequality to cultural participation in industrial nations, it is not 
suggested that high culture never served as a status symbol in pre-industrial 
societies, or that this more specific notion is foreign to historians. In fact it is 
prevalent, especially in art-historical studies detailing the life style of a country's 
upper classes. Thus Watkins (1990: 209) holds in a recent study on style in Jane 
Austen's England that with the changing distribution of wealth and increasing 
social mobility, land and money were no longer clear indications of status. 
Watkins adds that ever greatet emphasis was therefore laid on the qualities that 
distinguished a "true" gentleman, regardless of pedigree: a capacity for informed 
discourse on a variety of subjects, and a discerning appreciation of the arts. The 
historically inclined sociologist Elias (1939) developed another concrete hypoth-
esis about compensatory strategies employed by those "established" against 
outsiders: the European nobility, when losing its military powers with the advent 
of the absolute state at the beginning of modem times, maintained its social 
position by sharpening its standards of polite behavior. 
As indicated, this paper restricts itself to industrial nations. Thus the word 
"industrial" is not used in its narrow historical sense ("the industrial revolution"), 
as pertaining to England in the period between 1760 and 1830 with all its 
mechanical inventions. In accordance with current usage in general sociology 
(Lenski, Lenski, Nolan 1991) it is held to comprise every society relying on 
inanimate energy. Current "post-industrial" societies are treated as industrial 
societies going through yet another round of innovations based on inanimate 
energy. 
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3. Income, Education, and Cultural Participation in Five Countries 
This section reports on a secondary analysis of surveys on cultural participation 
undertaken in five industrial nations around 1980. The countries are Czechoslo-
vakia (year of survey: 1984), Denmark (1976), the Netherlands (1977), Hungary 
(1982), and the United States (1982). Note that two communist countries will be 
studied (Czechoslovakia and Hungary), one country with a strong social demo-
cratic tradition (Denmark), one with a tradition of immigration (the United 
States), and one middle-of-the-road (the Netherlands). The sample thus includes 
all types of polities deemed pertinent. Computer tapes for these surveys were 
obtained from national data-archives. Given this number of countries, the analy-
sis to be performed is at least on a par with that undertaken by Bourdieu and 
Darbel (1969), the only major comparative study on cultural participation. 
3.1. Data 
All data sets contain indicators for several cultural activities. The exact wording 
of the items and the number of items differ from survey to survey, and it would be 
tedious to detail them here. Suffice to say that they pertain to such matters as 
attending the theater, listening to-classical music, and buying literature. Within 
each of the countries, the intercorrelation between the several items is high, 
indicating that respondents can be scaled according to their general tendency to 
participate in high culture. The scores of one individual on all items for a country 
were combined into an index for cultural participation. All data sets also con-
tained information on respondent's age, education, father's education, and house-
hold income. Note that a person's financial resources are not measured by 
personal income, but more appropriately by household income. A person's 
cultural resources are indicated by education, but also by her or his father's 
education. Correlation matrices are presented in Appendix 1. 
3.2. Analysis: Five Nations Compared 
Table 1 presents the results for a multiple regression analysis that predicts 
cultural participation in each country separately and all countries combined on 
the basis of the four background characteristics mentioned. Coefficients range 
from +1 (a perfect positive connection between, say, education and cultural 
participation), by way of zero (no connection, no social inequality in cultural 
participation), to -1 (a perfect negative relation). First, the "average cultural 
participation model" (that constrains effects to be equal in all five countries) 
clearly brings out the pronounced influence of respondent's education compared 
to the other variables in the model. In all countries, respondent's education is the 
most important factor explaining cultural participation, and the effect of educa-
tion is about three times larger than that of household income. Cultural inequali-
) 
178 W.C. ULTEE, R. BATENBURG AND H.B.G. GANZEBOOM 
ties between educational categories are larger than those between income catego-
ries. Second, net of other factors, household income and father's education still 
significantly account for cultural consumption, with that of father's education 
being somewhat more important (but not for all countries) than that of household 
income. This finding attests to the potency of cultural resources. Third, the effect 
of age in three out of five countries is larger than that of household income. In 
four countries, older persons participate more in high culture, the Netherlands 
being the exception. This finding underlines the unimportance of financial 
resources for cultural participation. 
As to the question of whether social inequalities in cultural participation are 
similar for all nations, Table 1 does show that effects of household income on 
cultural consumption are equal. However, the hypothesis that the effect of 
respondents's education on cultural participation does not differ between coun-
tries has to be rejected. So has the hypothesis that the effect of father's education 
on cultural consumption is equal. The effect of age cannot be regarded as equal 
either. Since the effect of household income is relatively small, it can safely be 
maintained that the five industrial countries strongly differ with respect to social 
inequalities in cultural participation. 
Table 1 Multivariate regressions model for social ineqUillities in cultural participation in five 
countries; stondardized coefficients 
average Czechoslovakia Hungary Denmark Netherlands USA 
respondent's 
age .031 .110 .084 .086 -.099 .080 
father's 
education .140 .190 .163 .101 .169 .060 
respondent's 
education .337 .239 .482 .327 .293 .459 
household 
income .100 .095 .076 .076 .131 .104 
RZ 
.128 .362 .165 .259 .288 
test of differences: 
- equal effect of household income 4df 9 Chi1 not significant 
- equal effect of age 4df 148 Chi1 significant 
- equal effect of education 4df 49 Chiz significant 
- equal effect of father's education 4df 164 Chiz significant 
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One Bourdieu-Iike hypothesis holds that the educated redress a lower financial 
return from education by stronger cultural participation (a lower yield presuma-
bly caused by economic development or leftist politics). If a higher income less 
conclusively marks off educated persons, the educated become more cultured. 
Given the finding that countries differ as regards social inequalities in cultural 
activities and given this hypothesis, the pivotal question is whether in nations 
where the effects of education on income are weaker, the effects of education on 
cultural consumption (after discounting the effects of other background factors) 
are stronger. If that hypothesis is corroborated, evidence has been found in favor 
of compensatory strategies. 
To test this hypothesis, the ranking of countries according to the strength of 
the relation between education and household income ("the financial returns 
from education") is to be compared with their ranking according to the effect of 
education, net of three other background factors, on cultural consumption. It is 
also useful to compare the first ranking with the ranking of countries according to 
the zero-order correlation between education and cultural participation. Table 2 
contains these rankings. The first and third column in Table 2 are taken from 
Appendix 1, the second one has been selected from Table 1. 
Table 2 A comparison of (a) the zero-order correlation 
between education and household income, (b) the third-
order correlation between education and -::ultural partici-
pation, and (c) the zero-order correlation between educa-
tion and cultural participation for five industrial nations 
(rankings) 
(a) {b) (c) 
Czechoslovakia .193 (1) .239 (1) .304 (1) 
Denmark .287 (2) .327 (3) .389 (2) 
Hungary .430 (4) .482 (5) .580 (5) 
Netherlands .408 (3) .293 (2) .444 (3) 
United States .480 (5) .459 (4) .520 (4) 
Starting from this hypothesis, for Table 2 inverted rankings are expected: a 
country high in the first column is predicted to be low in the second and third one, 
and a country that is low in the first ranking should be high in the second and third 
column. However, Table 2 shows that rankings accord pretty well: in general, if 
a country is higher in the ranking depicted in the first column, it is higher in the 
ranking in the second and third columns too. There are two single-step inversions 
when comparing the first and second column and one single-step inversion when 
) 
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comparing the first and third column, and that is all. All this amounts to a 
disconfirmation of the hypothesis that a smaller financial return is offset by more 
cultural participation. 
Several caveats qualify this negative conclusion. The first is that cultural 
participation, although measured by an index of several indicators, is not meas-
ured in all countries in the same way. In fact, the negative effect of age on cultural 
participation for the Netherlands might be traced to a peculiarity in the Dutch 
index. An analysis employing a more comparable index or indicator of cultural 
participation seems desirable. The second rider is that the number of countries 
compared is extremely small. The two communist countries appear to differ a lot 
among themselves, making it awkward to regard the other countries as typical for 
their kind. An analysis for a higher number of countries is in order. The adage that 
a disconfirmed hypothesis should not be too hastily discarded seems applicable. 
The analysis to be reported in the next section pertains to one comparable 
indicator for cultural participation for all countries and to a decidedly higher 
number of countries. 
4. Education and Theatergoing in 17 Countries 
This section seeks to establish and explain the relation between a person's 
education and one indicator of cultural participation in 17 industrial countries in 
the 1980s. Of all possible indicators for cultured leisure, that of attending plays in 
theaters was chosen. This choice was one of expediency; it was estimated that for 
a high number of industrial countries a table could be found that crosses educa-
tion and frequency of theatergoing. Of all possible personal background charac-
teristics, education was singled out. The prime argument for this choice holds that 
the enduring effects of education are well-attested (Hyman, Wright, Reed 1975), 
and that in the previous section education proved its mettle as the most important 
variable predictive of cultural activities (see also Ganzeboom 1989). 
4.1. Data on Education and Theatergoing 
For various industrial nations, reports of empirical research on high culture were 
ransacked, yielding several useful tables. In addition, data-archives in various 
industrial countries containing computer tapes of social surveys were requested 
to provide a tabulation. That yielded valuable material too. This paper uses 17 
tables, each pertaining to a different industrial nation, but almost always to the 
1980s. Given the number of nations that by conventional criteria are deemed 
industrial, 24 to be exact (Lenski, Lenski, Nolan 1991: 248), this is a good catch. 
The omissions are East Germany, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, and 
Switzerland. A table for Japan was obtained, but given the different cultural 
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history of this industrial nation, it was not included. We are happy to have found 
tables for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, and although no table was 
procured for the whole of the Soviet Union, a table for Estonia alone was deemed 
to be useful. A run-down of the tables is given in Appendix 2. 
After choosing the tables to be analyzed, decisions were made on how to 
compare them. Four decisions are mentioned. The first one was to contrast all 
people who did not attend the theater in the year preceding the survey with those 
who did so at least once. This choice was the natural one given the high 
percentage of persons who never watched a play. The second decision was to 
contrast those having received more than secondary education with all others. 
This contrast is nicely in line with hypotheses about the way the upper strata of 
society distinguish themselves from those lower down the social scale. The third 
decision was to make an additional contrast, between those with primary educa-
tion only and all those having attained a higher level of education. This decision 
was taken on two grounds. Given the small number of countries to be compared, 
the data on one contrast provide a check upon the conclusions arrived at by the 
other contrast. In addition, if the cultural policies of governments are successful, 
they should show up in both contrasts. 
Fourthly, an odds ratio was computed for all resulting two-by-two tables for 
the relation between education and theatergoing. This measure is the product of 
the frequency in the upper left-hand cell of such a table with the frequency in its 
lower right-hand cell divided by the product of the upper right-hand cell frequen-
cy with the lower left-hand cell frequency {(a*d)/(b*c)}. There is a special 
reason why the relation between education and watching plays was characterized 
by an odds ratio. One of the technica! difficulties of research on inequality and 
stratification is how to devise a measure for differences between social strata with 
respect to some behavioral frequency that is free from the effects of the overall 
frequency of that act in the total population. It has been pointed out that odds 
ratios do that job (Heath 1981: Appendix 2; Heath, Jowell, Curtice 1985: 31). If 
an odds ratio equals unity, there are no inequalities between the levels of 
education contrasted; the more they are above unity, the more the higher level is 
overrepresented (and, in the unlikely case, the more they are below unity, the 
more the higher level is underrepresented). By employing odds ratios, differences 
between countries in the social distribution of cultural activity are freed from 
interference by differences between countries in the general level of cultural 
activity. 
For the 17 countries, the odds ratio involving the contrast between the 
highest level of education and all other levels correlated 0.36 with the odds ratio 
for the contrast between the lowest level of education and all other levels. This 
result is not discouraging, but underlines the very tentative nature of each and 
every result of this paper. 
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4.2. Data on Country Characteristics 
This paper not only seeks to establish differences between industrial nations in 
the connection between education and theatergoing, but also seeks to explain 
them by invoking country characteristics. Given the state of the art of research on 
income disparities, social mobility, and educational heterogamy, data for four 
country features have been used: level of economic development, whether or not 
the country in its recent past was governed by the communist party, whether or 
not its government included social democrats over a long period, and whether or 
not it had a tradition of immigration. 
Australia, Canada, and the United States were classified as countries with a 
tradition of immigration, all other industrial countries featured in this paper were 
not. Communist countries were Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, and Poland. 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden were regarded as social demo-
cratic. Data on a country's level of economic development in 1980 were taken 
from Summers and Heston (1988). The data pertain to per capita gross national 
product in dollars, and do not employ exchange rates, but purchasing power 
parities. To obtain a value for Estonia, 20% was added to the value for the Soviet 
Union. (This decision was based upon Anonymous 1991.) An attempt to quantify 
the amount of money governments spent on high culture remained unsuccessful. 
In addition, no sufficiently long and useful list of theater-ticket prices in various 
countries was found. 
To test Bourdieu's hypotheses about the reproduction of inequality by way 
of compensatory strategies, additional variables were included on income dispar-
ities within a country, social mobility, and educational heterogamy. Data on 
income disparities were found in World Bank (1990: 236-37). Two measures 
were chosen: the percentage of total net household income going to the richest 
10% of all households, and the percentage of total net household income going to 
the poorest 20% of all households. Values for Czechoslovakia were taken from 
Vecemik (1987). Morrison's (1984) data for the Soviet Union were held to apply 
to Estonia. Values for Austria are missing. 
Data on social mobility and educational heterogamy were taken from Ultee 
and Luijkx (1990: 132, 135, 141; where possible, data for the 1980s were 
chosen). The data for social mobility are the odds ratios for the movement across 
the line between manual and non-manual occupations. The higher the odds ratio, 
the less mobility there is. The data for educational heterogamy are the step 
parameter .of a loglinear model for a 4 *4 table. The higher the step parameter, the 
more widespread educational heterogamy. Mobility and heterogamy data are not 
available for Estonia. Appendix 2 contains all data to be analyzed. 
\ ) 
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4.3. Is the Relation between Education and Theatergoing Similar in all Indus-
trial Nations? 
The first question is whether the relation between education and frequency of 
theatergoing is similar or different for the 17 industrial nations. Table 3 presents 
for each country the odds ratio for the contrast between the primary-school 
educated and all others, and for the contrast between persons having more than 
secondary education and those having less. In the first case, the average odds 
ratio is 4.1, with a standard deviation of2.5 (61 %); in the second case the mean is 
5.0, with a standard deviation of 1.3 (26%). On this basis, the hypothesis that 
cultural inequalities are similar in industrial societies has to be rejected. 
Table 3 Odds ratios for the relation between education and going w the theater (a) for the 
contrast between those with the highest level of education and all others, (b) for the contrast 
between those with the lowest level of education and all others 
(a) (b) 
communist countries 
Czechoslovakia 6.0 2.8 
Estonia 3.7 5.0 
Hungary 6.5 10.5 
Poland 6.9 5.0 
average 5.8 5.8 
immigration countries 
Australia 4.6 3.5 
Canada 2.4 3.6 
United States 5.0 9.3 
average 4.0 5.5 
social democratic countries 
Austria 6.3 5.1 
Denmark 4.8 1.7 
Finland 5.8 2.5 
Norway 4.0 3.4 
Sweden 3.8 2.2 
average 4.9 3.0 
other countries 
Belgium 5.5 2.5 
France 6.3 4.4 
Germany, F.R. 5.3 3.6 
Netherlands 4.0 1.6 
United Kingdom 3.4 2.8 
average 4.9 3.0 
all countries overall average 5.0 4.1 
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4.4. Do Country Characteristics Explain Differenc:es in the Relation between 
Education and Theatergoing? 
The next question is to what extent the relation between the education of an 
industrial nation's inhabitants and the frequency with which they attend the 
theater can be accounted for by such country characteristics as a communist or 
social democratic government, or a tradition of immigration. Are cultural ine-
qualities smaller in communist, social democratic, and immigration countries? 
And are they smaller in communist countries than in social democratic ones? 
The averages in Table 3 make clear that conventional hypotheses about the 
effects of polity on various types of inequalities are disconfirmed for the case of 
cultural inequalities. Communist states do deviate from other polities - by 
showing larger cultural inequalities. In addition, there is some tendency for 
immigration countries to have larger cultural inequalities too. Conservative and 
social democratic nations are on a par with respect to cultural inequalities. To 
some extent politics does make a difference - but not the expected one. 
Table 4 The regression of odds ratios for the relation between education and theatergoing on 
politicol and ecmwmic country .. haracteristics; odds ratios (a) for the contrast between those 
with the highest level of education and all others, (b) for the contrast between those with the 
lowest level of education and all others; standardized regression coefficients (* significant at 
the .20 level) 
(a) (b) 
immigration -.28 .40' 
communism .29 .51' 
R1 
.21 .31 
adjusted R1 .10 .21 
economic development -.45 .06 
immigration -.17 .38' 
communism -.04 .55' 
R1 
.31 .28 
adjusted R1 .10 .16 
economic development -.41' -.40' 
immigration -.17 .45' 
R1 
.27 .21 
adjusted R1 .17 .09 
economic development -.56' .31 
communism -.08 .66' 
R1 
.25 .20 
adjusted R1 .14 .08 
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The question to be raised now is whether the findings just reported for 
political factors are also obtained if the relation between economic development 
and one type of cultural inequality and that between economic development and 
polity is taken into account. To answer this question, several multiple regressions 
were run. Table 4 contains results. Judging on the basis of adjusted R2 and 
significant coefficients, at least for the odds ratio contrasting those with the 
lowest education with all others, the conclusion about immigration and commu-
nism just stated still appears to hold. Adding economic development to the 
regression equation does not improve its fit. However, for the odds ratio contrast-
ing persons with the highest education with all others, economic development 
appears to be the only pertinent variable. Although one simple overall conclusion 
is not possible, conventional hypotheses about the consequences of political 
variables for cultural inequalities are disconfirmed. 
4.5. The Relationship between the Effect of Education on Theatergoing and 
other Measures for Societal Inequality 
Although the findings just reported confirm Bourdieu's hypothesis about com-
pensatory strategies of reproduction, this support may be regarded as weak. After 
all, data for only one strategy of reproduction have been used. A stronger test 
ascertains the relation between the type of cultural inequality featured in this 
section, on the one hand, and income disparities, father-son occupational mobil-
ity, and educational heterogamy on the other hand. Table 5 presents pertinent 
findings. 
Table 5 The regression of odds ratios for the relation EJetween education and theatergoing on 
other measures for societal inequality; odds ratios (a) for the contrast between those with the 
lowest level of education and all others; standardized regression coefficients (* significant at 
the .20 level) 
(a) (b) 
father-son occupational mobility .19 -.42" 
educational heterogamy .00 -.46. 
Rz 
.04 .28 
adjusted R2 -.10 .18 
income share richest 10% -.3s· -.06 
Rz 
.12 .00 
adjusted R2 .05 -.06 
186 W.C. ULTEE, R. BA TENBURG AND H.B.G. GANZEBOOM 
Again, the two measures for the relation between education and theatergoing do 
not yield the same results. Indeed, of three significant coefficients one has the 
wrong sign. The lower the income share of the richest 10%, the more theatergo-
ing by those with the highest level of education surpasses that of all-others. This 
is as predicted following Bourdieu. In addition, the more social mobility, the 
larger the differences in theatergoing between those with the lowest education 
and other persons. This is in Bourdieu's vein too. But finally: the more education-
al heterogamy, the smaller the differences in theatergoing between persons with 
the lowest education and others. This is not as expected if Bourdieu-like compen-
sations occur. 
5. Conclusions and Speculations 
By analyzing two different data sets, this paper found ample support for the 
hypothesis that industrial nations differ in social inequalities with respect to 
cultural participation. These differences cannot be explained by hypotheses 
holding that inequalities are smaller in communist, social democratic. and immi-
grant nations. There is some support for the Bourdieu-inspired hypothesis that if 
the position of the established - as measured by their income share, by social 
mobility, and by educational heterogamy- is weaker, social inequalities in 
cultural participation are larger. It is repeated that this support is only slight. 
Future research on the questions addressed in this paper is worthwhile, and it is 
best pursued by comparing as many countries as possible using as simple 
measures for cultural inequalities as possible. 
The findings made in this paper are not very favorable regarding the 
tenability of hypotheses inspired by Bourdieu's work for industrial nations during 
the 1980s. Yet, although they are not fully true, it would be rash to maintain that 
they are completely false. It is in this spirit that the final speculations of this paper 
on "1992" employ some of Bourdieu's hypotheses once more. The argument is 
that because of Western Europe's economic integration, its cultural hierarchy 
becomes extended and less accessible. 
Even Eurosceptics sense that there is something wrong with popular worries 
about the end of national cultures in an economically integrated Western Europe. 
Mrs. Thatcher, in her speech in Bruges in 1988, stated that the cathedrals and 
literature of Great Britain show how much of British cultural wealth is derived 
from the other countries of Europe. Since cultures never were isolated to begin 
with, questions about their disappearance pose the issue poorly. Is the underlying 
issue, rather, whether economic unification makes for the further amalgamation 
of national cultures, and if so, which national culture will become dominant? 
This question is still not very good. If societies are stratified, then cultural unity 
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within any one country - a single "national culture" - is a fiction: besides the 
dominant Culture of the upper strata (which finds intermittent adherence else-
where in society), other subcultures exist which are rooted in the lower rungs of 
the social scale. 
Even then, the question whether the cultures of the upper strata of the EC-
member countries will grow to resemble one another and whether those of their 
lower strata will do so too, is still rather vague. Merton (1957) stated that in 
societies like those of Western Europe the lower strata have a way of life focused 
on the here and now, whereas the upper strata have a more cosmopolitan life 
style. The Culture of the upper strata goes back farther in time, anticipates future 
developments, and crosses borders more often. Thus the more precise question is 
whether economic unification will decrease or increase the gap in cosmopolitism 
between the cultures of the upper and lower strata of the emerging West Europe-
an supranational state. 
Let us try to answer this question. Even in modem society there is a fine and 
thin line between something that is distinct and something that is distinctive. In 
every society people vie for the esteem of others. Given that there is only one 
number one, demand always exceeds supply, and this situation makes people 
spend more and more time and energy on competing for the same amount of 
esteem. This explanation of inflation is applicable to anything that is valued by 
society, including fashion, interior decoration, architecture, and painting (Gom-
brich 1979). 
At present, Western Europe's national authorities are fuelling rivalries in the 
field of high culture. National orchestras tour the world, and state museums are 
hoarding treasures and putting on exhibitions. The completion of the EC may 
well foster this battle of the giants. Cultural elites, out of fear of losing the prime 
position they have in their own country, will press for protection by their national 
government. Out of fear of lower national prestige, some authorities will give in. 
On top of national high cultures, not very accessible to persons with less 
education and to those living outside cultural centers, arises a supranational high 
culture that is far removed from highly educated persons living in those national 
capitals that lose the new race. 
Since even in cultural matters the first blow is half the battle, Paris may 
become the permanent cultural capital of Europe. Here for several decades, 
presidents have been waging a prestige battle by cultural means. "Les grands 
projets" will become bigger, larger, and vaster. The cosmopolitan nature of 
French Megaculture transpires from the fact that the architect of the Opera 
Bastille is a Canadian from Uruguay and that the Opera's musical director was 
born in South Korea and trained in the United States. And what if Berlin becomes 
the capital of a united East and West Germany? A change in the European system 
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of economic and political power in favor of Germany, will intensify the competi-
tion for prestige between France and Germany. At present, West Germany's new 
museum buildings harmoniously fit into their environment. Perhaps their succes-
sors will come to tower over their surroundings like their current French counter-
parts ( cf. Schilgen 1990; Chaslin 1985). 
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Appendix 1 Correlation matrices 
Czechoslovakia, 1984 Social Class and Structure Survey, N=6171 
cultural participation 1.00 
household income .125 
respondent's education .304 
father's education .257 
respondent's age -.066 
1.00 
.193 
.138 
-.395 
Denmark:, 1976 Quality of Life Survey, N=5199 
cultural participation 1.00 
household income .182 
respondent's education .389 
father's education .247 
respondent's age -.113 
1.00 
.287 
.130 
-.114 
1.00 
.383 
-.258 
1.00 
.419 
-.301 
Hungary, 1982 Survey of Social Stratification, N=2190 
cultural participation 1.00 
household income .310 
respondent's education .580 
father's education .440 
respondent's age -.150 
1.00 
.430 
.180 
-.030 
Netherlands, 1977 Life Situation Survey, N=4159 
cultural participation 1.00 
household income .327 
respondent's education .444 
father's education .359 
respondent's age -.257 
1.00 
.408· 
.286 
-.287 
1.00 
.600 
-.380 
1.00 
.429 
-.254 
1.00 
-.391 
1.00 
-.116 
1.00 
-.300 
1.00 
-.272 
United States, 1982 Survey of Public Participation in the Arts, N=3500 
cultural participation 1. 00 
household income .340 1.00 
respondent's education .520 .480 1.00 
father's education .270 .320 .440 1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
respondent's age -.030 -.040 -.190 -.310 1.00 
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Appendix 2 Sources for crossings of education against theatergoing 
Australia: Social Science Data Archive, Canberra, Ms. Roach. 
Year: 1982. N = 823. 
Austria: Oesterreichisches Statistisches Zentralamt, Mr. Klein. 
Year: 1985. N = 529498. 
Belgium: D. Naeyaert & V. Claes, Vrijetijdsbesteding in Vlaanderen, deelrapport I. Leuven, 
1984. Year: 1983. N = 2276. 
Canadll: Departetnent des Sciences du Loisir, Quebec, Mr. Pronovost 
Year: 1983. N = 2305. 
Czechoslovakia: Federal Statistics Office, Mr. Titerova. 
Year: 1980. N = 35147. 
Denmark: Statistics Denmark, Mr. Hostrup-Pedersen. Year: 1986. N = 1916. 
Estonia: Department of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences, Mr. Rannik. 
Year: 1985. N = 1736. 
Finhuul: Finnish Centre of the International Theatre Institute, Ms. Suur-Kujala. Year: 1981. N = 
2276. 
France: Donnees Sociales, INSEE, Paris, 1984, pp. 509-512, in combination with Pratiques 
culturelles des Franfais, Ministere de Ia Culture, Paris, 1983, p. 413. Year: 1981. N = 
3884. 
Gerntllny, Federal Republic: Zentral Archiv fiir Empirische Socialforschung, Mr. Weinen. 
Year: 1985. N = 1986. 
Hungary: Tarki, Survey of Social Stratification, Mr. Kolosi. 
Year: 1982. N = 15838. 
Netherlands: Social and Cultural Planning Office, Time Budget Survey. 
Year: 1980. N = 2651. 
Norway: Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Mr. Henrichsen. 
Year: 1983. N = 3853. 
Pohuul: Polish centre of the International Theatre Institute, Ms. Majewska. 
Year: 1979. N = 19104. 
Sweden: Statistics Sweden, Ms. Brivkalne. Year 1982. N = 6054. 
United Kingdom: ESRC Data Archive, Essex, Mr. Banks. Year: 1983. N = 16024. 
United States of America: ICPSR Data Archive, Michigan, Ms. Morris. 
Year: 1982. N = 17229. 
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Appendix 3 Data matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Australia 46 35 45 39 44 258 0 0 1 8349 
Austria 63 51 44 60 999 999 0 1 0 8230 
Belgium 55 25 41 74 79 215 0 0 0 9228 
Canada 24 36 38 47 57 241 0 0 1 11332 
Czechoslovakia 60 28 41 39 61 193 1 0 0 7002 
Denmark 48 17 31 71 54 223 0 1 0 9598 
Estonia 37 50 999 999 92 232 1 0 0 6751 
Finland 58 25 46 53 63 217 0 1 0 8393 
France 63 44 42 51 63 255 0 0 0 9688 
Germany, F.R. 53 36 37 81 68 234 0 0 0 9795 
Hungary 65 105 29 35 109 187 1 0 0 5508 
Netherlands 40 16 47 41 69 230 0 0 0 9036 
Norway 40 34 42 45 62 212 0 1 0 11094 
Poland 69 50 53 45 97 210 1 0 0 5006 
Sweden 38 22 43 34 80 208 0 1 0 8863 
United Kingdom 34 28 52 39 58 233 0 0 0 7975 
United States 50 93 40 40 47 250 0 0 1 11404 
1 = odds ratio (*10) theatergoing for those with post-secondary 
education versus all persons with a lower level of education 
2 = odds ratio (*10) theatergoing for persons with primary 
education only versus all persons with a higher level of education 
3 = step parameter (*100) for educational heterogamy 
4 = odds ratio (*10) social mobility 
5 = income share of poorest 20% of households 
6 = income share of richest 10% of households 
7 = communist government (0 = no, 1 = yes) 
8 = social democratic government (0 = no, 1 = yes) 
9 = immigration (0 = no, 1 = yes) 
10 = gross domestic product per capita in U.S. dollars 
missing values: 999 
